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L. D. Guy, F. E. Mershon, and R. E. Snyder 
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Hampton, Virginia
ABSTRACT
Fracture mechanics methodology has developed rapidly 
over the past 10 years. Although not as yet suffi- 
ciently developed for the treatment of complex 
structures such as aircraft, it is believed that 
fracture mechanics can provide a sound basis for 
the design of simple structures such as pressure 
bottles or tanks. Consequently, the Viking Project 
has adopted its use for design of all pressure ves- 
sels on the Viking spacecraft to assure the long 
life under sustained pressure necessary for the 
trip to Mars.
INTRODUCTION
Fracture mechanics is a technology which has been 
developed principally in the last 10 years as a 
result of many unanticipated failures of structures 
during proof test or in service operation. More 
specifically, examination of structural components 
that failed unexpectedly have indicated that the 
failure origin was a small crack or cracklike flaw. 
Also, such failures were normally characterized by 
the absence of a large amount of plastically 
deformed or yielded material. A commonly cited 
example is the 260-inch-diameter steel (250 grade 
maraging steel) rocket motor case, which failed 
during test at a stress less than half of the design 
yield stress. The failure origin was traced to a 
small internal flaw in the heat-affected zone of a 
repair weld (Ref. (l)). Many other examples of 
brittle failure could be cited including those in 
tankage for the Apollo programs.
The study of brittle fracture and the development 
of test methods on a systematic basis was really 
started with the formation of a special ASTM Com- 
mittee a little over 10 years ago, at the suggestion 
of the National Academy of Science and the Depart- 
ment of Defense. Since that time, test methods have 
been highly developed and quantitative measures of 
fracture toughness have evolved. Unfortunately, 
the technology is not sufficiently advanced to 
handle many of the practical problems facing 
designers. The F-lll and the C5A, for example, 
have problems with failures associated with crack 
growth. At the present time, reliable methods are 
only beginning to be developed for treatment of 
complex structures such as these under the highly 
complex loading conditions that they experience. 
However, for the relatively simple structure of a 
pressure bottle or tank, such as are found in the 
Viking spacecraft, the methodology is rather well 
in hand. The present discussion, then, is confined 
to that fracture mechanics methodology that is based
on the work of Griffith and Irwin, and specifically 
as it is applied to the design of pressure vessels 
on the Viking spacecraft (V-S/C).
DISCUSSION OF FRACTURE MECHANICS
The basis for fracture mechanics is the fact that 
all structures have flaws (Fig. l). The flaw size 
may be too small to detect or too small to affect 
the strength of the structure. However, a flaw can 
grow in size under repeated loading and it may grow 
under sustained load, particularly in a corrosive 
environment. In the past, traditional design 
methods were adequate because design allowables 
were low and the materials used were ductile, tol- 
erant of flaws, and insensitive to environment.
For spacecraft, structural weight is a critical 
problem. This situation has led designers to 
increased design allowables through use of newer 
high-strength materials. However, many high- 
strength materials tend to be brittle and have 
lower fracture toughness. Low fracture toughness 
means the material is less tolerant of flaws. Also, 
the environments are more aggressive than in the 
past. In the past, failures were characterized by 
large amounts of plastic deformation or yielding, 
more nearly a plane stress condition. Brittle 
fracture, however, is characterized by only small, 
if any, plastic behavior - essentially a plane- 
strain condition. However, as will be shown later, 
this is dependent on the material and material 
thickness.
The goal of fracture mechanics is to provide a 
quantitative measure of resistance to unstable 
crack propagation. This measure is derived from 
consideration of the elastic stress field surround- 
ing the crack. Figure 2 shows the simplest formu- 
lation of the problem (Refs. (2), (3)). The sketch 
shows the elastic stress distribution along a line 
in the path of the crack in an infinite sheet sub- 
jected to uniformly distributed stress. The stress 
distribution is given by the equation shown on the 
figure where a is the half length of the crack 
and r is the radial coordinate of any point in 
the sheet. Because the crack is sharp, the calcu- 
lated local stress distribution contains a singu- 
larity. The numerator of the second term, sVita, 
measures the mathematical strength of the singularity 
and has been designated the stress intensity factor, K. 
The basic assumption in fracture mechanics is that unsta- 
ble fracture occurs when K reaches a critical value 
designated Kc (sometimes called fracture toughness).
7-1
Elastic theory predicts an infinite local stress at 
the crack tip for any loading on the part and leads 
to the use of a stress intensity factor rather than 
a simple concentration factor. Since the analysis 
is "based on elastic theory, it applies only to "brit- 
tle materials or those specimens having small enough 
plastic zones so that plane-strain conditions exist 
at the crack tip. The value of KQ, however, is a 
measurable quantity, since it depends only on the 
stress at which a test specimen fails and the length 
of the crack when it becomes unstable.
There is presently no known way to account precisely 
for the plasticity in the zone ahead of a crack. 
Also, a laboratory test specimen is seldom com- 
pletely in either plane stress or plane strain, but 
rather some proportion of both. This is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 3 based on data from Ref. (k). 
The solid curve shows values of Kc such as are 
obtained from tests of specimens of varying thick- 
ness for a given material. As can be seen Kc 
decreases as specimen thickness is increased and 
can reach a minimum value. The inset shows the 
cross section of the fracture surface. The dashed 
curve shows the proportion of flat surface to the 
thickness. The minimum value of Kc is labeled 
KIC and corresponds to a nearly completely square 
fracture suggesting that fracture was accompanied 
by very little plastic deformation. This fracture 
condition is characteristic of the plane-strain 
mode of failure. The value of Kjc is the plane- 
strain stress intensity factor at the critical con- 
dition of initiation of rapid fracture and is gen- 
erally termed the fracture toughness of the mate- 
rial. In fact, it is accepted as a material prop- 
erty. For thin specimens, the stress state is more 
nearly plane stress. Fracture mechanics has not 
been developed so that the sloping part of the 
curves can be treated with confidence, and most 
emphasis has been placed on determining the minimum 
value of Kjc .
Figure k shows one way that fracture toughness data 
are obtained (Ref. (5)). Specimens of the material, 
in this case 6A1-W titanium, are made containing a 
surface crack of a given size. It is this type 
specimen that will be used in obtaining the basic 
fracture data for the Viking pressure vessels. It 
is loaded until it fails at some stress level. The 
symbols are data points for many such specimens 
with varying crack size. No attempt is made to 
characterize the curve between yield and ultimate 
in equation form. Below the yield stress, the data 
are fitted with a curve according to the equation 
shown. This is the same equation that we had ear- 
lier in slightly different form. By varying the 
value of KI in the equation, a critical value is 
found which fits the data as shown. In this case 
the KIC value is 56 ksi y in.
Many different type specimens are tested in differ- 
ent ways, depending on the requirement of the appli- 
cation for which the data will be used. These 
include fatigue-cracked bend specimens, crack-line 
loaded specimens, edge-cracked sheet specimens, and 
fatigue-cracked round notched-bar specimens.
Another important consideration is that flaw growth 
can result from cyclic loading and/or from sustained 
loading in a hostile environment. Data from fracture
specimen tests then must be obtained to predict the 
number of cycles or the time the vessel must be 
under sustained pressure for an initial flaw to 
grow to critical size.
Figure 5 shows that for a given environment and 
cyclic-loading profile, the cycles to failure depend 
primarily on the initial stress intensity Kj^, 
that is, the stress intensity for the initial size 
crack as compared to the critical stress intensity 
KIC (Ref. (6)). The material is again 6A1-VV tita- 
nium. The data were obtained by cycling specimens 
with different size flaws at different stress 
levels. Both the best-fit curves and the 96% prob- 
ability, 99$ confidence level curve are shown.
Figure 6 illustrates the fact that flaw growth can 
occur under sustained loading. The ratio of the 
initial stress intensity, K-Q to Kjc is shown 
as a function of time. The slide also shows the 
most important characteristic observed in all 
sustained-load flaw growth experiments performed to 
date. That is, the existence of a threshold stress- 
intensity level for a given material in a given 
environment. Above this level, flaw growth can 
cause fracture if the load is sustained long enough. 
Below it a flaw will not grow no matter how long 
the load is sustained. This threshold, then, is 
the key to the design of safe pressure vessels that 
must sustain load for long periods of time. Values 
of KTH/^IC show a very marked dependence on envi- 
ronmental characteristics (media and temperature). 
Shown on the slide are values for a titanium forg- 
ing with a yield stress of 160 ksi for two different 
fluids at room temperature. In nitrogen tetroxide 
the KTH/KIC ratio is 0.83. However, with methanol 
KTJI is less than one-fourth the value of KIC 
(Ref. (6)), a potentially disastrous situation for 
a titanium methanol container designed by tradi- 
tional methods.
In obtaining values of KTJJ f°r the Viking Space- 
craft, environmental effects will be carefully con- 
sidered. For example, in the Orbiter, the oxidizer 
tanks contain NgOlj.. This fluid will contain small 
amounts of NO and, surprisingly, at least a certain 
amount is desirable. An increase in the amount of 
NO contained in NgOl^ fluid from 0.32$ to 0.63$ can 
increase the value of KTH/KIC f°r &A1-4V titanium 
by 8$. On the other hand, an increase in the oper- 
ating temperature can decrease the value of KTH-
The next two figures show the most important aspect 
of fracture mechanics and that is how it can be 
used to guarantee the life of a pressure vessel by 
proof testing.
Figure J ±s similar to Figure k. The value of Kjc 
will have been determined from the tests described. 
The test specimens will be of the same batch of 
material the tank is made of, the same heat, the 
same thickness, and in the same environment the tank 
will see. They will include welds and even speci- 
mens cut from excess material in the flanges of the 
tank itself. The proof test provides one highly 
important piece of information. If the tank sur- 
vives the proof test we know that if a flaw exists 
in the tank it can be no bigger than the value a^. 
This crack size then is less than the size of crack 
that will cause failure at the operating stress
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level. Using this size and the operating stress, 
the value of Kj^ is computed. It should "be noted 
that ; if for some reason such as an improperly 
welded seam, a local value of Kjc exists in the 
vessel that is lower than the value of Kjc 
obtained from specimen tests, the proof test results 
are still valid. Either the vessel fails in the 
proof test or any flaw in the local area of lowered 
fracture toughness must be even smaller than a,±. 
Hence the value of KJJ_ relative to Kjc is not 
changed.
Knowing the maximum size flaw that can exist in the 
tank as determined "by the proof test, and the value 
of Kji as determined for the operating stress, 
the life of the vessel is then determined as shown 
on Figure 8. From the experimentally determined 
curve for the tank material, the permissible life 
is given. Of course, the procedure may be reversed 
to determine the relation between proof stress and 
operating stress that will assure sufficient life.
For the Viking spacecraft, the pressure vessels 
will see only a few cycles of loading and sustained 
load flaw growth becomes of paramount importance 
because of the long travel time to Mars. Conse- 
quently, the relation between proof and operating 
stress must provide the assurance of long life under 
sustained load.
This paper has reviewed only the basic concepts of 
fracture mechanics needed to permit discussion of 
its use in design of the pressure vessels on the 
Viking spacecraft. A more general review is given 
in a recently published NASA space vehicle design 
criteria monograph (Ref. (6)) and a more detailed 
list of references and bibliography is contained in 
Ref. (3).
VIKING PRESSURE VESSEL DESIGN
Consider now the Viking spacecraft shown in Figure 9- 
It is composed of two major subsystems: the Viking 
Orbiter (VO) and the Viking Lander Capsule (VLC). 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory of Pasadena, Califor- 
nia, is responsible for the design of the VO and 
the Martin Marietta Corporation of Denver, Colorado, 
is the prime contractor for the VLC.
Figure 9 shows the V-S/C in the cruise configuration. 
The VO fuel and oxidizer tanks are both cylindrical 
with hemispherical end closures. One of the two VO 
helium pressurization tanks can be seen in Figure 9- 
The two nitrogen tanks on the VO are not shown, but 
are located at the same level as the temperature 
control louvers. The VLC has four fuel tanks. Two 
are attached to the aeroshell and two are attached 
to the lander body.
Figure 10 is a tabulation of preliminary estimates 
of some of the important physical characteristics 
of the spacecraft pressure vessels. The pressure 
vessels are all constructed of titanium 6A1-VV. 
All four of the VLC pressure vessels are spherical 
and contain hydrazine with nitrogen as the pressur- 
ization medium. The VLC deorbit and reaction con- 
trol system (RCS) tanks have bladders, weigh 
10.7 pounds each, and have an anticipated maximum 
operating pressure of 375 psi. The VLC terminal
descent engine fuel tanks do not' have bladders and 
operate at 535 psi. The maximum operating pressure 
of the VO fuel (MMH) and oxidizer (N20^) tanks is 
300 psi; however, prior to launch they will be pres- 
surized to only about 100 psi. They will not be 
brought to full pressure until after launch. The 
VO helium and nitrogen tanks both operate at 
1+000 psi. The weights given are, of course, only 
preliminary design values.
In the past, very few if any spacecraft pressure 
vessels have been designed on the basis of fracture 
mechanics data obtained specifically for that pur- 
pose. Rather, it has been utilized after the tank 
has been designed to provide quality assurance and 
to predict tank life and safety tolerances. For 
the Viking spacecraft, the required data will be 
obtained and used as the basis for design in addi- 
tion to conventional design methods for tensile 
yielding. JPL will make use of previously obtained 
fracture mechanics data acquired on the Lunar 
Orbiter, Apollo, and Mariner programs. In addition, 
JPL will do testing of welded coupons and at tem- 
peratures not covered by previous testing. MMC, 
however, must obtain all new data because adequate 
data obtained in the presence of the fluid their 
tanks contain are not available. In both cases, 
the surface crack-type specimen will be used as 
most nearly simulating pressure vessel flaws of 
interest. Specimens such as shown in Figure 11 will 
be machined from forged titanium alloy of the type 
to be used in the pressure vessels. The test media 
will be the fluid that the tank will contain. Since 
the proof testing will be conducted at room temper- 
ature (in air) and at cryogenic temperatures (liquid 
nitrogen), these conditions must also be included 
for Kjc tests. All tests will be uniaxially 
loaded in tension. Actual measured biaxial fracture 
toughness properties have been higher than uniaxial, 
therefore some degree of design safety may be real- 
ized by using uniaxial test data.
Fracture toughness values will be investigated for 
the four flaw conditions shown in Figure 11. MMC 
will test approximately 225 coupons in the process 
of establishing reliable values of the material 
fracture toughness (Kjc ) and the threshold stress 
intensity (K-pjj)- This will include 75 coupons for 
parent metal, 75 coupons for welds, and 75 for heat- 
affected zones. JPL will use approximately 150 in 
their program to obtain additional data. The data 
obtained in these programs will be analyzed statis- 
tically to determine values of Kjc and Krpjj that 
have a 99$ probability of nonexceedance with a 95$ 
confidence level. This is the same requirement set 
for MIL HDBK 5 "A" values.
Fracture toughness properties of forgings may vary 
with different lots and vendors; consequently, 
specimens will be tested from forgings supplied by 
several vendors. Finally, after the actual tank 
forgings have been received, specimens will be 
machined from excess material on the forging and 
tested to demonstrate conformance to the design 
values of Kjc and K^H.
As stated earlier, the concept of the proof test is 
the most important single factor in the use of 
fracture mechanics for pressure vessel design. 
Once the values of KIC and KTH have been
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established, the relation between the operating 
stress (design stress) and the proof-stress levels 
may be determined. Formal agreement between JPL, 
MMC, and VPO has been arrived at on establishment 
of this relation and it has been incorporated in 
the Viking '75 Project Spacecraft Structural Design 
Criteria. The relation is shown on Figure 12. The 
proof test, if successful, establishes the fact 
that if a flaw exists in the tank it can be no 
larger than a given size. Hence the operating 
stress must be less than the proof stress by the 
factor KTH/KIC- Since the proof test will be made 
at cryogenic temperatures, the variation of Kjc 
with temperature must be accounted for by introduc- 
ing the ratio of Kjc at room temperature to Kjc 
at proof temperature. Finally, to provide addi- 
tional conservatism, a safety tolerance, ST, has 
been introduced.
The safety tolerances to be used by Viking are 1.35 
for hazardous conditions and 1.15 for nonhazardous 
conditions. An example of the nonhazardous condi- 
tion is the VO fuel and oxidizer tanks which will 
not be fully pressurized until after launch and 
hence cannot endanger personnel. In the Apollo 
program, the safety tolerance used was 1.0. While 
high confidence is placed in the fracture mechanics 
approach, an additional degree of conservatism of 
1.15 was agreed upon. The hazardous safety toler- 
ance was arrived at by introducing a factor of 1.2 
which has previously been used by JPL. Thus the 
safety tolerance of 1.35 is approximately equal to 
1.2 times the safety tolerance of 1.15. The proof 
stress, by agreement of all parties in the Viking 
Project, will be a given percent of the yield 
stress.
Figure 13 illustrates how the proof-test procedures 
to be followed by Viking are used to assure high 
reliability of the tanks in service and at the same 
time provide the most efficient lightweight design. 
The value of Kjc is presently only a lower bound 
estimate based on the best data available and, of 
course, may change when all data have been obtained. 
The best available data indicate that for the thick- 
ness of the VLC tanks, the value of Kjc at cryo- 
genic temperature will be nearly the same as at room 
temperature. At greater thickness the material 
generally becomes more brittle and less tough at 
cryogenic temperatures. On the other hand, the 
yield stress at low temperature is considerably 
increased. If the proof test were made at room 
temperature the proof stress would be 0.90 of the 
yield stress or 1^4 psi. A successful test would 
then screen all flaws larger than a^. For testing 
at cryogenic temperatures, the proof stress would 
be 0.85 of the yield stress (at that temperature) 
or 20k psi. The cryoproof will then screen all 
flaws larger than &2 "which is even smaller than 
a]_. Admittedly, the chance of failure is greater 
for the cryoproof, however, it permits a higher 
operating stress and a lighter weight tank with no 
degradation in reliability or decrease in the guar- 
anteed life of the tank.
As a result of using the fracture mechanics approach, 
some Viking tanks will exceed ETR conventional 
factor of safety on proof and burst while others 
fall below those requirements. Figure llj- summarizes
this situation for the Viking pressure vessels 
indicated. Both the VLC, RCS tanks and the VO fuel 
and oxidizer tanks exceed proof-test requirements. 
The VLC, RCS tanks also exceed ETR burst require- 
ments and the Viking Project does not feel that a 
conventional factor of safety of 2.0 would provide 
an adequate margin of safety for the long-duration 
Viking mission for these tanks. Since the VO fuel 
and oxidizer tanks will not be pressurized until 
after the launch, they also meet the present range 
safety requirement. As can be seen from Figure li|, 
the other three sets of tanks will not meet the 
present ETR conventional factor of safety require- 
ments. Nevertheless, it is felt that the fracture 
mechanics design method provides the same safety 
tolerance on these tanks as on the tanks which do 
meet the ETR safety factor requirements. It should 
also be noted that substandard quality control, 
prior to the proof test of Viking pressure vessels, 
would cause a high rate of failures in the proof 
test. Poor quality control of tanks designed by 
conventional methods, however, could lead to the 
much less acceptable possibility of failures in the 
presence of personnel.
SUMMARY
The Viking Project has adopted the use of fracture 
mechanics for design of all pressure vessels on the 
Viking spacecraft as being more realistic than con- 
ventional design methods and because it can assure 
the long life under sustained pressure necessary 
for the trip to Mars. The fracture mechanics 
approach considers both tensile yielding and crack 
propagation modes of failure. It accounts for 
flaws in the tank wall that may not otherwise be 
detected. It accounts for flaw growth under sus- 
tained loading and cyclic loading in the environ- 
ment the tank will encounter. The proof test yields 
positive information on the maximum flaw in a tank 
and screens out all tanks that could burst prema- 
turely. It does not require destructive testing 
of any tank.
SYMBOLS
a - semiminor axis of the ellipse
x^/c2 + y^/a^ = 1 or crack depth of the 
semielliptical surface flaw, ~\/in.
Kj - plane-strain stress-intensity factor, k
Kic - plane-strain critical stress-intensity factor 
or fracture toughness of the material, ksi 
Yin".
Kli   plane-strain stress-intensity factor at ini- 
tial conditions, ksi "^fTn.
KTH " plane-strain threshold stress-intensity level, 
ksi Yin.
N - number of cycles
r - radial coordinate, in.
S - nominal stress level, ksi
ST - safety tolerance
SQ - maximum design operating stress, ksi
Sp - proof stress, ksi
Sy - yield stress, ksi
t - thickness of plate (specimen), in.
ay - local stress in y direction, ksi
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ALL STRUCTURES HAVE FLAWS
FLAW SIZE GROWS DUE TO:
CYCLIC LOAD ING 
STRESS CORROSION
IN THE PAST TRADITIONAL DESIGN METHODS WORKED BECAUSE
DESIGN ALLOWABLES WERE LOW
MATERIALS WERE DUCTILE
TOLERANT OF FLAWS 
INSENSITIVE TO ENVIRONMENT
FAILURE PLANE-STRESS
PRESENT DESIGN METHODS MUST ACCOUNT FOR
HIGH DESIGN ALLOWABLES 
MATERIALS WHICH ARE BRITTLE
INTOLERANT OF FLAWS
MATERIALS ARE IN AGGRESSIVE ENVIRONMENT 
FAILURE PLANE STRAIN 
Figure 1.- Why fracture mechanics?
THICKNESS, t
Figure 3.- Effect of plate thickness on fracture 
toughness and appearance of fracture.
CRACK BECOMES UNSTABLE WHEN
Figure 2. - Relation "between stress-intensity factor, 
K, and stress in the vicinity of a crack.
STRESS 
S, ksi
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160
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100
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FLAW SIZE, a
Figure 4.- Empirical flaw-size data, 6A1-4V STA 
titanium, room temperature.
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BEST-FIT LEAST- 
SQUARE CURVE
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YIELD STRENGTH = 160 ksi
10 100 
CYCLES TO FRACTURE
1000 10000
Figure 5-- Cyclic flaw-growth data for heat-treated
6A1-W titanium.
KTH
Klc
-
^——~ -_
MATERIAL
6AI-4V STA
ay 
ksi
160
FLUID K TH/ K Ic
N204(.6%NO) a 83
METHANOL a 24
I i
.1 100.0LO 10,0
TIME, hr 
Figure 6. - Sustained-load flaw growth data.
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APPLIED
STRESS
S
FLAW SIZE, a
Figure 7.- Applied stress versus flaw size.
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Figure
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Proof test as used to establish permis- 
sible life.
M71 TYPE SCIENCE PLATFORM 
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300 LB THRUST ENGINE 
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2
2
2
2
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N2H4 /N2
N204 or 
MMH
H e
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(LB)
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20.8
130.0
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Figure 10.- Viking spacecraft pressure vessel 
summary.
Figure 9-- Viking spacecraft in cruise configuration.
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Figure 11.- Surface crack specimens.
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WHERE:
S 0 = DESIGN STRESS
xlc, PT
JL. 
ST
KTH = THRESHOLD STRESS INTENSITY
1C, RT 
<Ici PT
CRITICAL STRESS INTENSITY AT ROOM TEMP. 
CRITICAL STRESS INTENSITY AT PROOF TEST TEMP
S = PROOF TEST STRESS LEVEL
ST = SAFETY TOLERANCE
Figure 12.- Viking fracture mechanics criteria.
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STRESS 
S, ksi
60
.02
PRESSURE 
VESSEL
VLC, RCS
VLC, TERM
VO, FUEL 
AND OX ID.
VO, He TANK
VO, N2 TANK
PROOF 
TEMP.
R. T.
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CRYO
PROOF FACTOR
ETR REQ'D
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L5
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BURST FACTOR
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1.54
1.54
WT. SAVED 
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-L4
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* TANKS NOT FULLY PRESSURIZED ON PAD
Figure Ik.- Influence of fracture mechanics on 
Viking pressure vessel design.
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Figure 13. - Proof stress versus flaw size,
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